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THE CHANGING U.S. ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 
by Murray Weidenbaum 
The American economy is at a turning point. After enjoying the longest peacetime 
expansion in American history, we are now sliding into recession. Some perspective is 
necessary. 
It is easy, perhaps too easy, to blame the recession in the American economy on the 
sharp run-up in oil prices brought about by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. True, the rise in oil 
prices from $18 a barrel to approximately $40 is the equivalent of a large OPEC tax on the 
American economy. That is so because we now import about one-half of our total oil supply. 
This "tax increase" is clearly an economic depressant, pulling billions of dollars of 
purchasing power out of the national economy. But it could only tip us into recession because 
we were already so close to that condition just before the invasion of Kuwait in early August. 
Sliding Into Recession 
Let us recall the business outlook during late July 1990. The expansion was rapidly 
losing steam. Three major capital-intensive sectors-automobiles, construction, and 
defense-were turning down simultaneously. Large inventories of unsold 
automobiles had resulted in cutbacks in production in the bellwether motor vehicle industry. 
The delayed impact of tighter monetary policy in 1989 and early 1990 reenforced the 
lingering effects of the 1986 tax reforms which reduced or eliminated many special incentives 
or "shelters" to real estate investment. The result was to bring down housing and office 
· construction to very low levels. Housing starts in July fell for the sixth consecutive month; 
they fell again in August. 
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On top of the declines in these two key capital-intensive civilian industries, major 
defense contractors had begun to lay off substantial numbers of employees in response to 
reductions in the military budget. Many of the large and medium-size firms in the military 
market were also announcing future reductions in their work forces. 
As a result of these three negative forces-the unusual coincidence of simultaneous 
declines in autos, housing, and defense--veteran forecasters in July were reevaluating their 
projections. Several of them had already concluded that the recovery phase of the business 
cycle was drawing to a close. 
The uncertainties in the Middle East, generally, and in the world oil market, 
specifically, reenforced the negative outlook in the domestic economy in the weeks that 
followed the invasion of Kuwait. The University of Michigan's index of consumer expectations 
fell from 77 in July to 63 in August. 
In other times, we might have expected the Federal Reserve (Fed) to offset the negative 
developments in the economy by shifting to an easier monetary policy. However, the large 
increases in oil prices had a double whammy on the U.S. economy, simultaneously depressing 
demand and raising costs. While these price increases work their way through the industrial 
system, the Fed is understandably reluctant to expand the money supply to any significant 
degree. Alan Greenspan and his colleagues are sitting on the fence. 
The sharp upward spurt in the estimated federal budget deficit for the next several 
years, brought about in part by the ever more costly bailout of the S&Ls, immobilizes fiscal 
policy as a potential source of additional stimulus. Thus, the recessionary forces have been 
allowed to build up steam. 
The Federal Reserve can follow its current course of action (you may call it inaction) 
because the likelihood is that the recession will not last much beyond a very limited period of 6-
9 months. Nor do we face the escalating double-digit inflation of the early 1980s. The 
prospect is for inflation to be contained in the 5-6 percent price range. That gives the Fed the 
confidence that they could responsibly increase the growth of the money supply should the 
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economy weaken more than is now anticipated. 
Should the embargo of Iraq continue without military hostilities, the pace of inflation in 
the United States likely would decline after the initial run-up in oil prices was fully reflected in 
the chain of production. If Iraq abandons its capture of Kuwait (either with or without external 
military intervention), the change will be more dramatic. 
In either event, the Fed could shift to a more expansive posture and the basis for the 
next upturn in the American economy would be set in place. If the embargo continues, the 
upturn likely will be moderate. In contrast, a successful conclusion to the Middle East crisis 
would bolster business and consumer confidence substantially and thus contribute to a stronger 
economic expansion. An extended shooting war would force forecasters (including this intrepid 
economist) back to the drawing board! 
The Political Economy 
It has become fashionable in the last few weeks to berate both Congress and the White 
House for the budget fiasco. Few profiles in courage will be etched by the historians of fiscal 
policy. Indeed, there is enough blame to go around, covering both ends of Pennsylvania 
Avenue and both sides of the political aisle. 
But we should not overlook the accomplishments of American economic policy over the 
past decade-and there are enough kudos to go around also. Since the beginning of 1981: 
1. Escalating double digit inflation has been eliminated. 
2. More new jobs have been created (17 million) than in Western Europe and Japan put 
together. 
3. We have enjoyed a greater degree of labor peace-fewer strikes and fewer people on 
strike-than at any other time since the Department of Labor started collecting the 
dMa. · 
4. Income tax rates have been cut across the board. The indefensible 70 percent top 
rate has been eliminated. We now realize that, albeit indirectly, those punitive rates 
only led to numerous tax loopholes. 




Perhaps the most significant result did not occur in the United States at-all. I am 
referring to the positive "demonstration effect" overseas that resulted from our efforts to reduce 
the heavy hand of government. Witness the simultaneous spread of free-market economies in 
various parts of the globe, in both Western and Eastern Europe. 
Here at home, a new sense of realism is evident in business and personal decision 
making. Labor and management have both become more cost conscious. They are even aware 
of the awesome term "productivity" in a society in which government does not come so readily 
to rescue the losers in the marketplace. 
Congress hasn't outlawed recessions. It couldn't do so even if that volatile body could 
reach agreement on such a benign objective. Nevertheless, short-term problems should not 
cloud our bright long-term future. The newly liberated nations of Eastern Europe do not look 
to Japan or Western Europe as their ideal. According to their own testimony, their role model 
is the United States. We must be doing something right. 
